--- title: "Bank Monitoring with On-Site Inspections: Heitz, Martin & Ufier (2026)" description: >- Distilled: Using proprietary transaction-level data on nearly 30,000 construction loans from a failed bank, this paper provides empirical evidence that banks trade off monitoring intensity with loan origination terms, use inspection report text to inform draw decisions, and that increased on-site inspections causally reduce loan default. J. Finance 2026, CC BY 4.0. Eight core results with source locators, datasets, the identification strategy, and the regression specifications. sidebar: label: Heitz-Martin-Ufier 2026 order: 1 tags: [paper-summary, banking, bank-monitoring, credit-risk, moral-hazard, adverse-selection, construction-loans, panel-regression, instrumental-variables, text-classification, open-access, cc-by, peer-reviewed, unreplicated, data:fdic-construction-loans, data:fhfa-hpi, data:corelogic] paper: authors: Amanda Rae Heitz, Christopher Martin, and Alexander Ufier authorList: - { family: Heitz, given: Amanda Rae, orcid: "0000-0001-8942-8705", affiliation: "Tulane University, A. B. Freeman School of Business; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" } - { family: Martin, given: Christopher, affiliation: "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" } - { family: Ufier, given: Alexander, affiliation: "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" } year: 2026 venue: The Journal of Finance 81(2), April 2026, 687-737 venueShort: J. Finance 2026 doi: 10.1111/jofi.70026 jel: codes: [G21, G28, D82] assignedBy: claude-opus-4-8 date: 2026-06-05 topics: - Banking stability, regulation, efficiency - Credit Risk and Financial Regulations dataAccess: proprietary-confidential outcome: - loan default (EVENTUALDEFAULT, MATURITYDEFAULT, TERMDEFAULT) - draw denial probability (DRAWDENIED) - on-site inspection frequency (ALLTOTERMINAL, ALLINSPECTIONS) outcomeClass: [credit-risk, credit-supply] license: >- CC BY 4.0 (confirmed via Crossref DOI metadata: content-version vor, URL http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, delay-in-days 0, start 2026-01-22; corroborated by artifact p. 687 Creative Commons Attribution License notice) licenseShort: CC BY 4.0 access: open machineAccess: "blocked-paywall (Wiley site wrapper; CC-BY VOR licence confirmed in Crossref DOI metadata 2026-06-01)" redistribution: extract-only (CC BY 4.0 permits mirroring; PDF not hosted in this batch) resultsCount: 8 citedByCount: 2 methods: role: applies-method family: reduced-form-causal buildsFrom: - panel-regression - instrumental-variables - text-classification identification: instrument contributionType: [new-fact, new-data] mechanisms: [information-asymmetry, moral-hazard] introducesData: true scope: region: US assetClass: construction loans (residential, single-family) period: "~1999..2010" frequency: daily dataType: [administrative, text] granularity: [individual, transaction] n: "28,939 loans; 11,586,385 loan-day observations" findings: - { ref: R1, outcome: "on-site inspection frequency (ALLTOTERMINAL, ALLINSPECTIONS)", metric: coefficient, value: "LOG(LOANAMT) on ALLINSPECTIONS = 0.168*** (t=37.83); ORIGSPREAD on ALLINSPECTIONS = -0.0140*** (t=-5.08); ORIGFEES on ALLINSPECTIONS = 0.00190*** (t=9.86)", direction: mixed, vsBenchmark: "coefficients consistent with monitoring-for-terms trade-off across loan characteristics" } - { ref: R2, outcome: "on-site inspection frequency (ALLTOTERMINAL, ALLINSPECTIONS)", metric: coefficient, value: "TERM on ALLINSPECTIONS = +0.0172*** (t=39.51); TERM on ALLTOTERMINAL = -0.0417*** (t=-4.06)", direction: mixed, vsBenchmark: "opposite signs on total vs per-100-day inspection measures for loan maturity" } - { ref: R3, outcome: "on-site inspection frequency (ALLTOTERMINAL, ALLINSPECTIONS)", metric: coefficient, value: "FICO on ALLTOTERMINAL = -0.00326*** (t=-18.35); OWNERBUILDER on ALLINSPECTIONS = +0.149*** (t=29.85)", direction: positive, vsBenchmark: "riskier borrowers receive more intensive monitoring across all risk proxies" } - { ref: R4, outcome: "draw denial probability (DRAWDENIED)", metric: coefficient, value: "YEARBEFOREFAILURE on DRAWDENIED = +0.0645*** (t=13.60); YEARBEFOREFAILURE on INSPECTIONDATE = +0.00291*** (t=6.96)", direction: positive, vsBenchmark: "denials and inspections both increase in the year before bank failure" } - { ref: R5, outcome: "draw denial probability (DRAWDENIED)", metric: coefficient, value: "NEGATIVEWORDS on DRAWDENIED = +0.00164** (t=2.21) to +0.00372*** (t=4.54); POSITIVEWORDS on DRAWDENIED = -0.00207* (t=-1.71) to -0.00234*** (t=-2.27)", direction: mixed, vsBenchmark: "negative language raises denial probability, positive language lowers it" } - { ref: R6, outcome: "loan default (EVENTUALDEFAULT, MATURITYDEFAULT, TERMDEFAULT)", metric: coefficient, value: "IV coeff = -0.0380*** (t=-23.70); OLS coeff = -0.0195*** (t=-19.46); 1 s.d. increase -> -5.85 pp default probability", direction: negative, vsBenchmark: "IV estimate approximately twice as large as OLS" } - { ref: R7, outcome: "loan default (EVENTUALDEFAULT, MATURITYDEFAULT, TERMDEFAULT)", metric: coefficient, value: "IV 2nd-stage: -0.0380 (draw schedule), -0.0396 (TIMETOFIRST), -0.0261 (inspector FE); all significant at 1%; Cragg-Donald F > 29.8", direction: negative, vsBenchmark: "consistent across three independent instruments" } - { ref: R8, outcome: "loan default (EVENTUALDEFAULT, MATURITYDEFAULT, TERMDEFAULT)", metric: pp-effect, value: "1 extra inspection per 100 days: -1.14 pp maturity default, -0.81 pp term default net; threat channel = 63-77% of total benefit", direction: negative, vsBenchmark: "threat channel dominant over direct early-stopping channel" } resultType: confirms relatesTo: - { cite: "Diamond (1984)", doi: "10.2307/2297430", relation: tests, note: "provides empirical support for delegated monitoring theory predicting banks reduce default via monitoring" } - { cite: "Diamond (1991)", doi: "10.1086/261775", relation: tests, note: "tests prediction that monitoring effectiveness associates with lower loan spreads and more frequent monitoring for riskier loans" } - { cite: "Rajan and Winton (1995)", doi: '10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04052.x', relation: tests, note: "finds consistent evidence that shorter-term loans are monitored more frequently per unit time" } - { cite: "Calomiris and Kahn (1991)", relation: tests, note: "consistent with moral hazard channel: inspections and denials increase when housing prices fall or foreclosure rates rise" } - { cite: "Gustafson, Ivanov and Meisenzahl (2021)", doi: '10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.08.017', relation: extends, note: "extends their syndicated-loan monitoring study to single-lender construction loans, adding draw-denial outcomes and causal IV framework" } - { cite: "Cerqueiro, Ongena and Roszbach (2016)", doi: "10.1111/jofi.12332", relation: builds-on, note: "prior direct evidence that collateral value affects monitoring frequency; this paper extends to loan outcomes and causal identification" } - { cite: "Kling (2006)", doi: "10.1257/aer.96.3.863", relation: builds-on, note: "judge/inspector fixed effects IV design adapted for inspector-level instrument in Panel C of Table VIII" } - { cite: "Frandsen, Lefgren and Leslie (2023)", doi: '10.1257/aer.20201860', relation: builds-on, note: "judge fixed effects methodology applied to inspector assignment instrument" } - { cite: "Loughran and McDonald (2011)", doi: "10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01625.x", relation: builds-on, note: "word sentiment dictionary used to score positive and negative language in inspection report comments" } openQuestions: - "Results cover a single bank that failed; external validity to other lenders and lending contexts is uncertain (pp. 691-692)." - "Sample consists exclusively of construction loans; broader applicability to other loan types where monitoring differs structurally is an open question (p. 692)." - "The paper cannot separate adverse selection from moral hazard channels in the cross-section because borrowers deterred from applying are not observed (p. 720)." - "Whether bank loan officers optimally weighted the threat benefit of monitoring versus the direct stopping benefit is left to future work; the paper notes a likely misalignment due to incentives and observable cost structures (pp. 732-733)." extraction: - by: paper-distiller (claude-sonnet-4-6) date: 2026-06-01 role: extracted note: "Full text read (pp. 687-737 plus Tables I-VIII and Figures 1-3); eight results extracted from the CC-BY PDF. Not human-verified. Not reproduced." - by: paper-verifier (claude-sonnet-4-6) date: 2026-06-01 role: verified note: "Locators and reported magnitudes re-checked against the source PDF; two errors fixed in R5: NEGATIVEWORDS upper-bound t-stat corrected from 3.30 to 4.54 (col 4, not col 5), and POSITIVEWORDS significance corrected from *** to ** for the -0.00243 entry (col 3 of Table VI). All other locators, coefficients, and t-stats verified correct." - by: paper-distiller (claude-sonnet-4-6) date: 2026-06-03 role: extracted note: >- Added classification axes (identification, contributionType, mechanisms, introducesData, data-scope) from a fresh PDF read; existing results and sections unchanged. - by: paper-verifier (claude-sonnet-4-6) date: 2026-06-03 role: verified note: >- Classification axes (identification, contributionType, mechanisms, introducesData, data-scope) re-checked against the source PDF; one fix applied - granularity changed from [transaction, firm] to [individual, transaction] because 46% of borrowers are individual homeowners (OWNERBUILDER program, p. 701/704) and the primary IV unit is the loan/borrower, not a firm; all other axes confirmed correct. - by: paper-distiller (claude-sonnet-4-6) date: 2026-06-04 role: extracted note: >- Added the effectiveness axis (findings[] per Core-results row, resultType) built from the page's already-verified Core-results table and relatesTo edges; existing results and sections unchanged. - by: paper-verifier (claude-sonnet-4-6) date: 2026-06-04 role: verified note: >- Effectiveness axis (findings[] values/direction, resultType) re-checked against the source PDF; one fix applied to R5 POSITIVEWORDS upper bound (value corrected from -0.00243 to -0.00234 and significance restored to *** per Table VI col 3, p. 714; a prior verifier had mis-corrected both); all other seven findings entries and resultType=confirms verified correct. licenceVerification: - source: Crossref REST API works/10.1111/jofi.70026 checked: 2026-06-01 by: paper-distiller (claude-sonnet-4-6) found: "license[0] content-version=vor, URL=http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, delay-in-days=0, start=2026-01-22" rightsSignalConflict: false --- **What this is.** The paper's core results, the empirical design, and the regression specifications: enough to know what it found and how, without reading all 51 pages. To replicate or extend, read the full source at [https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70026](https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70026). ## TL;DR Using proprietary transaction-level data on nearly 30,000 construction loans from a large bank that failed during the financial crisis, Heitz, Martin, and Ufier provide direct empirical evidence on the determinants and consequences of bank monitoring via on-site inspections. They find that banks trade off monitoring intensity with loan terms (more monitoring pairs with lower spreads, higher amounts, shorter maturities), that monitoring escalates when borrower credit quality declines or the bank approaches failure, and that inspection report text predicts draw denials: negative language raises denial probability while positive language lowers it. Using three independent instrumental variables (the draw schedule, time to first inspection, and inspector fixed effects), they establish that increased inspection frequency causally reduces loan default by 3.8 to 6.1 percentage points per one-percentage-point increase in monitoring frequency, approximately double the OLS estimate. The gains come primarily through the threat of inspections inducing borrowers to complete projects rather than through the bank catching and stopping failing projects early. ## Core results Magnitudes and significance are as reported; `*`/`**`/`***` = 10%/5%/1%. Locators point into the source PDF. | # | Result | Locator | Magnitude | |---|---|---|---| | R1 | Larger loans receive more and more frequent inspections; lower spreads and lower fees associate with more monitoring, consistent with banks trading off monitoring intensity for favorable terms | Table III, p. 709; §III.A, p. 712 | LOG(LOANAMT) coeff on ALLINSPECTIONS = 0.168\*\*\* (t=37.83); ORIGSPREAD coeff = -0.0140\*\*\* (t=-5.08); ORIGFEES coeff = 0.00190\*\*\* (t=9.86) | | R2 | Shorter-maturity loans are monitored more frequently per 100 days; longer-maturity loans have more inspections in total | Table III cols (1)-(2), p. 709 | TERM: ALLINSPECTIONS = +0.0172\*\*\* (t=39.51); ALLTOTERMINAL = -0.0417\*\*\* (t=-4.06) | | R3 | Riskier borrowers (lower FICO, higher CLTV, speculative loans, owner-builders) receive significantly more intensive monitoring | Table III, pp. 709-710 | FICO: ALLTOTERMINAL = -0.00326\*\*\* (t=-18.35); SPECULATING = 0.344\*\*\* (t not reported for col 2); OWNERBUILDER: ALLINSPECTIONS = +0.149\*\*\* (t=29.85) | | R4 | Draw denials increase and inspection probability increases as the bank approaches failure, inconsistent with gambling-for-resurrection | Table V, p. 713 | YEARBEFOREFAILURE: DRAWDENIED = +0.0645\*\*\* (t=13.60); INSPECTIONDATE = +0.00291\*\*\* (t=6.96) | | R5 | Negative language in inspection reports increases draw denial probability; positive language decreases it; results hold with inspector, loan, and day fixed effects | Table VI, p. 714 | NEGATIVEWORDS: DRAWDENIED = +0.00164\*\* (t=2.21) to +0.00372\*\*\* (t=4.54); POSITIVEWORDS: DRAWDENIED = -0.00207\* (t=-1.71) to -0.00234\*\*\* (t=-2.27) | | R6 | OLS: more frequent monitoring (ALLTOTERMINAL) associates with lower eventual default; IV estimates are approximately twice as large as OLS | Table VIII Panel A col (1) vs col (3), pp. 727-728 | IV coeff = -0.0380\*\*\* (t=-23.70); OLS coeff = -0.0195\*\*\* (t=-19.46); IV: 1 s.d. increase in ALLTOTERMINAL -> -5.85 pp default probability | | R7 | All three IV specifications (draw schedule, time to first inspection, inspector fixed effects) produce consistent causal estimates of monitoring on default | Table VIII Panels A-C, pp. 727-729 | IV 2nd-stage coeffs: -0.0380 (draw schedule), -0.0396 (TIMETOFIRST), -0.0261 (inspector FE); all significant at 1%, Cragg-Donald F > 29.8 across panels | | R8 | Decomposition shows monitoring reduces defaults primarily through the threat channel (63-77% of total benefit); the direct early-stopping effect is smaller but also present | §V.A, pp. 723-724 | 1 extra inspection per 100 days: -1.14 pp maturity default, -0.81 pp term default net (total -1.95 pp); threat share = 63-77% of total benefit | **Overall (paper's conclusion).** Bank on-site inspections provide direct support for three theoretical monitoring channels: adverse selection screening (riskier loans receive more monitoring and better terms, deterring high-risk applicants), moral hazard mitigation (monitoring intensifies when collateral values fall and economic conditions worsen), and early intervention (monitoring causally reduces default, primarily through the credible threat of stopping failing projects). Both the occurrence and the threat of inspections matter. ## Theory / model The paper has no formal structural model. The tested hypotheses derive from a set of theoretical predictions in the bank monitoring literature, and the results provide empirical support for the delegated monitoring theory of Diamond (1984), under which banks reduce default through monitoring. The analysis extends the syndicated-loan monitoring study of Gustafson, Ivanov, and Meisenzahl (2021) to single-lender construction loans, adding draw-denial outcomes and a causal IV framework: **H1 (Adverse selection / screening, Diamond 1991, Rajan 1992).** Banks that commit to monitoring can offer better terms to borrowers they screen, because monitoring reduces the residual risk borne by the lender. Testable implication: monitoring intensity trades off negatively with loan spreads and fees and positively with loan amounts. **H2 (Moral hazard, Calomiris and Kahn 1991, Rajan and Winton 1995).** Moral hazard is greater when project returns are lower. As collateral value declines or foreclosure risk rises, banks intensify monitoring to discipline borrowers. Building on the prior direct evidence in Cerqueiro, Ongena, and Roszbach (2016) that collateral value affects monitoring frequency, this paper extends the link to loan outcomes and causal identification. Testable implication: monitoring and draw denials increase when local housing price growth is negative or local foreclosure rates rise. **H3 (Early intervention, Diamond and Rajan 2001, Acharya, Hasan and Saunders 2006).** Monitoring allows banks to detect default risk early and cut credit extension to failing projects. Testable implication: monitoring reduces loan default; the effect operates both through directly stopping failing loans (maturity-to-term default conversion) and through the threat of stopping them (discouraging borrowers from deviating). **Identification challenge.** Banks endogenously assign more inspections to higher-risk loans, so OLS confounds the treatment with selection. The IV strategy is described in the Method section. The paper also exploits the within-loan time-series structure to include loan fixed effects for the draw-denial and inspection-date analyses, absorbing all time-invariant loan-level heterogeneity. ## Method The paper applies three standard empirical methods. No novel method is proposed. **Cross-sectional monitoring determinants (equation 1, p. 707).** OLS and Poisson regressions of monitoring measures on loan origination characteristics: $$\text{Monitoring}_l = \gamma \cdot \text{Origination}_l + \beta \cdot X_l + \epsilon_l$$ - $$\text{Monitoring}_l$$ is ALLINSPECTIONS, ALLTOTERMINAL, or TIMETOFIRST. - $$\text{Origination}_l$$ are loan terms (log amount, spread, fees, CLTV, TERM). - $$X_l$$ are fixed effects: property zip (3-digit), borrower zip, loan origination day. Poisson regression is used for count variables (ALLINSPECTIONS, columns 1 and 4); OLS elsewhere. **Panel regressions for draw denials and inspections (equations 2-3, pp. 708, 712).** Daily loan-day or draw-request panel regressions: $$ \text{DrawDenied}_{dtl} = \gamma \cdot \text{Covariate}_{dtl} + \zeta \cdot Z_l + \epsilon_{dtl} \tag{2} $$ $$ \text{InspectionDate}_{lt} = \gamma \cdot \text{Covariate}_{lt} + \zeta \cdot Z_l + \epsilon_{lt} \tag{3} $$ - $$Z_l$$ are loan fixed effects (absorbing all time-invariant loan characteristics). - Covariates include HOUSING PRICE INDEX and FORECLOSURE RATE (time-varying, at the five-digit zip code level) and YEARBEFOREFAILURE / STARTOFYEARBEFOREFAILURE (bank distress). - Standard errors clustered at the three-digit property zip code level. **Instrumental variable estimation (Table VIII).** Three separate 2SLS specifications for the causal effect of monitoring on eventual default: $$\text{First stage:} \quad \text{ALLTOTERMINAL}_l = \pi \cdot \text{Instrument}_l + \delta \cdot \text{Controls}_l + \nu_l$$ $$\text{Second stage:} \quad \text{EVENTUALDEFAULT}_l = \alpha \cdot \widehat{\text{ALLTOTERMINAL}}_l + \beta \cdot \text{Controls}_l + \epsilon_l$$ Three instruments are used in three independent panels: - Panel A: DRAWTOTERMINAL (the draw schedule frequency, set at origination). - Panel B: TIMETOFIRST (time to first inspection, proxy for project complexity). - Panel C: Inspector indicator variables (inspector fixed effects, akin to judge-IV design from Kling (2006) and Frandsen, Lefgren, and Leslie (2023)). Controls throughout include log loan amount, origination fee, FICO, CLTV, loan term, a speculating indicator, owner-builder indicator, and fixed effects for property zip, borrower zip, and loan origination day. Standard errors clustered by three-digit zip code and loan origination day. **Text sentiment scoring (Loughran-McDonald, §IV, pp. 719-720).** From each on-site inspection report, the paper calculates: $$\text{POSITIVEWORDS} = \frac{\text{count of positive words}}{\text{comment length in chars}} \times 100$$ $$\text{NEGATIVEWORDS} = \frac{\text{count of negative words}}{\text{comment length in chars}} \times 100$$ using the Loughran-McDonald (2011) financial sentiment dictionary. These sentiment scores are then entered as covariates in a draw-denial panel regression (equation 2 format) with inspector, loan, day, and zip fixed effects. ## Empirical specifications **Determinants of monitoring (Table III, p. 709).** Cross-sectional Poisson (cols 1, 4) and OLS (cols 2, 3) regressions. LHS: ALLINSPECTIONS (total lifetime inspections), ALLTOTERMINAL (inspections per 100 active days), TIMETOFIRST (months to first inspection). RHS: LOG(LOANAMT), ORIGSPREAD, TERM, ORIGFEES, CLTV, FICO, SPECULATING, OWNERBUILDER, BUDGETITEM. FEs: property zip (3-digit), borrower zip, loan origination day. N = 28,939 (27,567 for TIMETOFIRST). Sample: full construction loan portfolio. **Bank actions and macroeconomy (Table IV, p. 711).** Panel OLS at the draw request (DRAWDENIED) or loan-day (INSPECTIONDATE) level. LHS: DRAWDENIED or INSPECTIONDATE. RHS: HOUSING PRICE INDEX (annualized price change, 5-digit zip, from FHFA), FORECLOSURE RATE (monthly foreclosure rate, 5-digit zip, from CoreLogic). FEs: loan-level. SE: clustered at three-digit zip code. N (DRAWDENIED) = 330,579 draw requests; N (INSPECTIONDATE) = 10,806,815 loan-days. **Bank actions approaching failure (Table V, p. 713).** Same panel framework as Table IV with loan fixed effects. LHS: DRAWDENIED or INSPECTIONDATE. RHS: YEARBEFOREFAILURE (indicator, last 365 days before bank failure) and STARTOFYEARBEFOREFAILURE (indicator for start of that calendar year). SE: clustered at three-digit property zip. **Draw decisions based on inspection comments (Table VI, p. 714).** Panel OLS. LHS: DRAWDENIED. RHS: POSITIVEWORDS, NEGATIVEWORDS, COMMENTLENGTH. FEs vary across columns: Day, Loan, Inspector, Property Zip, Borrower Zip, Loan Origination Day. N = 143,074 (matched inspection reports to draw requests). SE: clustered by three-digit property zip code and day. **Determinants of default (Table VII, pp. 722-723).** Cross-sectional OLS (equation 4, p. 721). LHS: EVENTUALDEFAULT (col 1), MATURITYDEFAULT (col 2), TERMDEFAULT (col 3), and variants adding ALLTOTERMINAL and DRAWTOTERMINAL (cols 4-8). RHS: ALLTOTERMINAL, LOG(LOANAMT), ORIGSPREAD, TERM, FEES, CLTV, FICO, SPECULATING, OWNERBUILDER, BUDGETITEM. FEs: property zip, borrower zip, loan origination day. SE: clustered by three-digit zip code and day. N = 28,939. **IV estimation (Table VIII, pp. 727-729).** Three panels, each with 2SLS (col 1), first-stage OLS (col 2), OLS (col 3), and reduced form (col 4). LHS (second stage): EVENTUALDEFAULT. Endogenous: ALLTOTERMINAL. Instruments: Panel A: DRAWTOTERMINAL. Panel B: TIMETOFIRST. Panel C: inspector indicators. Controls: log loan amount, origination fees, FICO, CLTV, TERM, SPECULATING, OWNERBUILDER, BUDGETITEM. FEs: property zip, borrower zip, loan origination day. SE: clustered by zip and day. Weak instrument tests: Cragg-Donald F exceeds 29 in all panels (Panel A: 13,839; Panel B: 1,558; Panel C: 29.8). ## Datasets used | Dataset | Role in paper | Wiki page | |---|---|---| | FDIC proprietary construction loan servicing data (single failed bank) | Primary: loan terms, draw requests, inspection reports, inspection dates, borrower identifiers, default outcomes; ~11.6 M loan-day obs, 28,939 loans, ~10 years | No page yet | | FHFA Housing Price Index (five-digit zip, monthly) | Time-varying collateral value proxy for moral hazard analysis (Tables IV, V) | [FHFA HPI](/wiki/datasets/fhfa-hpi/) | | CoreLogic foreclosure rate data (five-digit zip, monthly) | Foreclosure rate as measure of local economic stress (Tables IV, V) | [CoreLogic](/wiki/commercial/corelogic/) (licensed) | Sample: approximately 10 years of transaction-level data from a single large bank (over $1 billion in assets) that failed during the financial crisis. Construction loans primarily for residential single-family properties across the continental US. Daily frequency; 11,586,385 loan-day observations; 28,939 loans; 143,074 matched inspection-to-draw-request observations for text analysis. ## When to read the full paper Read the [original](https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70026) if you need: the full set of robustness checks (Internet Appendix, including exclusion of non-single-family loans); the univariate correlations for the IV first stages; the detailed construction of the inspector strictness measure via leave-one-out; or the back-of-the-envelope optimality calculation on monitoring costs versus benefits (pp. 732-733). The paper is also the primary source for institutional background on construction loan draw schedules and the two-part default taxonomy (maturity versus term default) that is specific to this lending market. The locators above point to the exact tables and figures. ## Attribution and rights Source: peer-reviewed, *The Journal of Finance* 81(2). This distillation was extracted by an LLM on 2026-06-01 and is **not human-verified or independently reproduced**. The CC BY 4.0 licence permits mirroring; the verbatim PDF is not hosted in this batch. > **Attribution (CC BY 4.0).** Heitz, Amanda Rae, Christopher Martin, and Alexander Ufier. > "Bank Monitoring with On-Site Inspections." > *The Journal of Finance* 81, no. 2 (April 2026): 687-737. > DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70026. (c) 2026 The Author(s). > Licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). > This page is an **adaptation** by the Institute for Automated Research: > core results extracted and re-expressed; **changes were made**.