FDIC construction-loan servicing records (restricted access)

Confidential FDIC data: not exercised here

This is confidential FDIC loan-servicing data for a single failed bank. It is not for sale and not publicly downloadable: it carries no provenance badge because there is no access path we can run here. Researchers reach it only through an FDIC affiliation or an approved restricted-data arrangement, inside a secure environment, with output subject to disclosure review. The page documents what the collection is and the gotchas; treat it as unverified. This is the honest grade under the institute’s Verified discipline.

The FDIC construction-loan servicing records are the loan-level servicing files for the construction-loan book of one failed bank, held by the FDIC as receiver. Their distinguishing feature is the draw-request and on-site inspection detail: each construction loan funds in stages against physical inspections, so the data records inspection dates, inspection reports, draw requests, loan terms, borrower identifiers, and default outcomes. It lets researchers observe bank monitoring at the loan-action level. A paper we distill uses it: Heitz, Martin & Ufier use it as the primary dataset (about 11.6 million loan-day observations, 28,939 loans, roughly ten years) to study how on-site inspections affect monitoring and moral hazard.

• Cost: not for sale. Restricted-access confidential FDIC data.
• Source: the FDIC (records of a failed bank held in receivership).
• Coverage: the construction-loan portfolio of a single failed institution over its history; it is one bank, not a system-wide sample.

Access (restricted)

• No public download. The servicing microdata is confidential and is not posted.
• Through an FDIC affiliation or approved program. Access is limited to researchers at the FDIC or others granted entry to the restricted data, worked inside a secure environment with output subject to disclosure review.

Gotchas (the ones that bite pipelines)

These are the failure modes to expect; they are documented, not verified here.

• It is one bank. The data is the portfolio of a single failed institution, so external validity is the central caveat; patterns may reflect that bank’s practices, region, and cycle. Do not generalize to the banking system without argument.
• Construction loans are staged and unusual. Funds disburse in draws against inspections, so balances rise over the loan’s life and a “draw” is not a new loan; standard loan-level conventions (one balance, one origination) do not apply. Model the draw schedule explicitly.
• Loan-day structure inflates observation counts. The ~11.6M figure is loan-days, not loans; clustering and serial correlation within a loan are severe. Cluster at the loan (and borrower) level.
• Inspection timing is partly endogenous. Inspections are triggered by draw requests and by the bank’s own concern; treating inspection timing as exogenous mismeasures the monitoring effect. Be explicit about identification.
• A failed bank is a selected sample over time. The portfolio is observed up to and through failure, so later vintages are conditioned on the bank’s deterioration. Watch for survivorship within the book.
• Output is disclosure-reviewed and cannot be redistributed. Results leave the secure environment only after review, and the microdata itself cannot be shared.

Citation

Cite the source, e.g.: FDIC construction-loan servicing records (single failed bank), confidential; accessed under restricted-data arrangement, YYYY-MM-DD. State the observation unit (loan-day versus loan), the clustering, and the caveat that it is one institution.