Spain CIR: Central de Informacion de Riesgos credit register (restricted access)

Confidential supervisory data: not exercised here

The CIR is confidential supervisory data held by the Banco de Espana. It is not for sale and not publicly downloadable: it carries no provenance badge because there is no access path we can run here. Researchers reach it only through a Banco de Espana affiliation or an approved restricted-data arrangement, inside a secure environment, with output subject to disclosure review. The page documents what the collection is and the gotchas; treat it as unverified. This is the honest grade under the institute’s Verified discipline.

The CIR (Central de Informacion de Riesgos) is the Banco de Espana’s credit register: a near-complete loan-level record of corporate lending by Spanish banks, with credit volumes, maturities, and default/non-performance status, matched to bank-level supervisory data (balance sheet, capital, liquidity, ROA, NPL ratios). It is one of the longest-running credit registers and a workhorse for Spanish credit-supply and monetary-transmission research. A paper we distill uses it: Jimenez, Kuvshinov, Peydro & Richter use the CIR for loan-level monthly data on all corporate loans by Spanish banks, 1984 to 2008Q3 (a 10% random sample), with credit volumes, maturities, and defaults, matched to Banco de Espana bank supervisory characteristics.

• Cost: not for sale. Restricted-access confidential supervisory data.
• Collector: Banco de Espana (the CIR; matched supervisory reports).
• Coverage: corporate loans by Spanish banks above the reporting threshold, monthly, with a long history; the threshold and scope have changed over time.

Access (restricted)

• No public download. The microdata is confidential and is not posted.
• Through a Banco de Espana affiliation or approved program. Access is limited to researchers at the Banco de Espana or others granted entry to the restricted data, worked inside a secure environment with output subject to disclosure review.

Gotchas (the ones that bite pipelines)

These are the failure modes to expect; they are documented, not verified here.

• The reporting threshold censors small loans. Only loans above the threshold are reported, and it has changed over the register’s life; a borrower can enter or leave for reporting reasons. Do not read a missing loan as no lending.
• A random sample is sometimes used, not the full register. Some projects (and the distilled paper) draw a random sample (for example 10%) for tractability; sampling changes the standard errors and the multi-bank-firm structure. Be explicit about whether you use the full register or a sample.
• Drawn versus committed and default timing. Credit drawn, credit committed, and the date a loan is flagged non-performing are distinct; using the wrong one mismeasures supply or risk. Match the concept and the default definition to your question.
• Identifier joins and bank mergers. Firms and banks are linked across the CIR, the supervisory data, and firm-financials sources (the Mercantile Register); Spain’s heavy bank consolidation breaks bank identifiers over time. Verify the crosswalk and track mergers.
• Multi-bank firms drive the identification. The register’s value is the within-firm cross-bank variation; single-bank firms cannot be used for borrower-fixed-effect designs. Keep the multi-bank structure in mind.
• Output is disclosure-reviewed and cannot be redistributed. Results leave the secure environment only after review, and the microdata itself cannot be shared.

Citation

Cite the source, e.g.: Central de Informacion de Riesgos (Banco de Espana), confidential supervisory data; accessed under restricted-data arrangement, YYYY-MM-DD. State the sample window, whether the full register or a random sample was used, and the default/non-performance definition.