FDIC failed-bank bidding and resolution records (restricted access)

Confidential FDIC data: not exercised here

This is confidential FDIC resolution data. It is not for sale and not publicly downloadable: it carries no provenance badge because there is no access path we can run here. Researchers reach it only through an FDIC affiliation or an approved restricted-data arrangement, inside a secure environment, with output subject to disclosure review. The page documents what the collection is and the gotchas; treat it as unverified. This is the honest grade under the institute’s Verified discipline.

The FDIC failed-bank bidding and resolution records are the proprietary bid-level files from how the FDIC resolves failed banks. When a bank fails, the FDIC runs a Purchase and Assumption (P&A) auction; the records capture bidder identities, bid terms, the FDIC’s internal least-cost estimates, and subsequent loss-share claims by the acquirer. Because some auctions produce near-tied bids between acquirer types, the data supports close-bid quasi-random designs. A paper we distill uses it: Johnston-Ross, Ma & Puri use the failed-bank bidding records (P&A bid values, acquirer identities, FDIC least-cost estimates) for a close-bid design on private-equity acquirers, with the loss-share records for claims by acquirer type, alongside public FDIC Call Reports and Summary of Deposits.

• Cost: not for sale. Restricted-access confidential FDIC data.
• Source: the FDIC (resolution and receivership records).
• Coverage: resolved bank failures (concentrated in and after the 2008-2013 wave), at the bid and transaction level.

Access (restricted)

• No public download. The bid-level microdata is confidential and is not posted; the FDIC publishes only summary failure information openly.
• Through an FDIC affiliation or approved program. Access is limited to researchers at the FDIC or others granted entry to the restricted data, worked inside a secure environment with output subject to disclosure review.

Gotchas (the ones that bite pipelines)

These are the failure modes to expect; they are documented, not verified here.

• Bids are conditioned on the failure happening. The sample is failed banks that went to resolution; selection into failure (and into receiving qualified bids) precedes the auction. The close-bid design addresses who wins, not who fails. Keep the two selection stages distinct.
• Bidder eligibility is screened. Not everyone can bid; the FDIC pre-qualifies bidders, so the bidder pool is selected, especially for non-bank or PE acquirers. Do not treat the bidder set as the universe of potential buyers.
• Bid structures are not scalar. A P&A bid bundles deposit premium, asset discounts, and loss-share terms; reducing it to one number discards the structure that determines the least-cost ranking. Use the FDIC’s own least-cost comparison.
• Loss-share claims realize over years. Loss-share payments accrue well after resolution and depend on later asset performance; a snapshot understates eventual claims. Pin the as-of date.
• Identifier joins to public data. Linking to Call Reports and other bank data needs the failed-bank identifier crosswalk; acquirers also change over time. Verify the link.
• Output is disclosure-reviewed and cannot be redistributed. Results leave the secure environment only after review, and the microdata itself cannot be shared.

Citation

Cite the source, e.g.: FDIC failed-bank bidding and resolution records, confidential; accessed under restricted-data arrangement, YYYY-MM-DD. State the resolution window, the bid concept used, and the loss-share as-of date.